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A fundamental problem in economics is determining how agreements are reached in situations where the parties
have some market power. Of particular interest are questions of efficiency and distribution:
• How efficient is the agreement?
• How can efficiency be improved?
• How are the gains from agreement divided among the parties?
Here, I explore these questions in the context of bilateral monopoly, in which a buyer and a seller are bargaining
over the price of an object.
Two features of my analysis, which are important in any bargaining setting, are information and impatience.
The bargainers typically have private information about their preferences and will suffer some delay costs if
agreement is postponed. Information asymmetries between bargainers will often lead to inefficiencies: The
bargainers will be forced to delay agreement in order to communicate their preferences. Impatience will tend to
encourage an early agreement and will make the parties’ communication meaningful. Bargainers with high delay
costs will accept inferior terms of trade in order to conclude agreement early, whereas patient bargainers will
choose to wait for more appealing terms of trade.
Some authors have examined the bargaining problem in a static context, focusing solely on the role of
incomplete information and ignoring the sequential aspects of bargaining. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)
analyze bargaining as a direct revelation game. In this game, the players agree to a pair of outcome functions: one
that maps the players’ statements of their types into an expected payment from buyer to seller, and one that maps
the players’ statements into a probability of trade. These outcome functions are chosen in such a way that truthful
reporting is an equilibrium strategy for the players. An important feature of this game is that it is static: Outcome
functions are selected, the players report their true types, and then dice are rolled to determine the payment and
whether or not trade occurs. To ensure that the players have the proper incentives for truthful reporting, the game
will end with positive probability in disagreement even when there are substantial gains from trade. Thus, in the
event that the randomization device calls for disagreement, the players may find themselves in a situation in
which it is common knowledge that there are gains from trade.
Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) analyze a strategic game in which both players make offers simultaneously,
and trade occurs at a price between the two offers if the seller’s offer is less than the buyer’s offer. This game is
closely related to the direct revelation game, in that it is static. Moreover, it can be shown that for a particular
class of examples, the simultaneous-offers game implements the direct revelation game in which the outcome
functions are chosen to maximize the players’ ex ante utility. As in the direct revelation game, this game ends
with positive probability in a state in which both bargainers know that gains are possible (since their respective
reservation prices have been revealed), and yet they are forced to walk away from the bargaining table. Thus, the
bargaining game assumes implicitly that the players are able to commit to walking away without trading, after it
has been revealed that substantial gains from trade exist.
In situations where the bargainers are unable to make binding agreements, it is unrealistic to use a bargaining
mechanism that forces them to walk away from known positive gains from trade. Such mechanisms violate a
broad interpretation of sequential rationality as discussed by Selten (1976) (in terms of subgame perfection), and
later by Kreps and Wilson (1982), if one applies sequential rationality not only to the hypothesized game, but to
the game form as well. In particular, one should restrict attention to mechanisms that satisfy sequential
rationality: It must never be common knowledge that the mechanism induced at any point in time is dominated by
an alternative mechanism.
When there is uncertainty about whether or not gains from trade exist, any static game will violate sequential
rationality. The players must have time to learn through each other’s actions whether gains are possible. In a
sequential game, the players communicate their preferences by exhibiting their willingness to delay agreement.
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delay agreement, and so will propose attractive terms of trade that the other is likely to accept early in the
bargaining process. On the other hand, high-cost sellers and low-valuation buyers will prefer to wait for better
terms of trade. Static games must use a positive probability of disagreement to ensure incentive compatibility,
where the probability of disagreement increases as the gains from trade shrink. The advantage of delaying
agreement rather than forbidding agreement is that mechanisms can be constructed in which negotiations
continue so long as each bargainer expects positive gains. Thus, the bargaining will not end in a state in which it
is common knowledge that the players want to renege on their agreed-upon outcome.
Two approaches can be taken in the analysis of perfect bargaining games. The first approach is to examine
specific extensive-form games, which determine the set of actions available to the players over time. Intrinsic to
any bargaining process is the notion of offers and replies: Bargaining consists of a sequence of offers and
decisions to accept or reject these offers. Who makes the offers; the time between offers, responses, and
counteroffers; and the possibilities for commitment are determined by the underlying communication technology
present in the bargaining setting. This communication technology will imply, in part, a particular bargaining
game in extensive form. Cramton (1984), Sobel and Takahashi (1983), and Fudenberg, Levine, and Tirole
(Chapter 5 in this volume) illustrate the analysis of particular extensive forms that are perfect bargaining games.
The second approach, and the one adopted in this chapter, is to analyze a general direct revelation game,
which maps the players’ beliefs into bargaining outcomes. An important distinction between direct revelation
games and strategic games is that the direct revelation game does not explicitly model the process of bargaining.
The sequence of offers and replies that eventually leads to an outcome is not studied in the direct revelation game
as it is in strategic games. However, embedded in each sequential bargaining mechanism is a particular form of
learning behavior, which can be analyzed. In addition, much can be learned about how information and
impatience influence the efficiency of the bargaining outcome and the allocation of gains between players. Thus,
even though bargainers will not play direct revelation games in practice, analysis of these games is a useful tool
to determine how well the bargainers can hope to do by adopting an appropriate strategic game.
The difference between the static direct revelation game analyzed by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and
the sequential direct revelation game considered here is that in the sequential game, the outcome functions not
only determine the probability and terms of trade, but also dictate when trade is to take place. In the static game
trade may occur only at time zero whereas in the sequential game trade may occur at different times depending on
the players’ reports of their private information. Thus, by analyzing sequential bargaining mechanisms, one is
able to infer what the players’ learning process is over time. Furthermore, by analyzing mechanisms that are
sequentially rational, one can study what bargaining outcomes are possible when the bargainers are unable to
make binding agreements.
The introductory discussion presented in this chapter considers the simplest type of sequential bargaining
games in which the players’ time preferences are described by known and fixed discount rates. I begin by
characterizing the class of perfect bargaining mechanisms, which satisfy the desirable properties of incentive
compatibility (i.e., each player reports his type truthfully), individual rationality (i.e., every potential player
wishes to play the game), and sequential rationality (i.e., it is never common knowledge that the mechanism
induced over time is dominated by an alternative mechanism). It is shown that ex post efficiency is unobtainable
by any incentive-compatible and individually rational mechanism when the bargainers are uncertain about
whether or not they should trade immediately. I conclude by finding those mechanisms that maximize the
players’ ex ante utility, and show that such mechanisms violate sequential rationality. Thus, the bargainers would
be better off ex ante if they could commit to a mechanism before they knew their private information. In terms of
their ex ante payoffs, if the seller’s delay costs are higher than those of the buyer, then the bargainers are better
off adopting a sequential bargaining game rather than a static mechanism; however, when the buyer’s delay costs
are higher, then a static mechanism is optimal.
The methodology of this paper is based on Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983). I have freely borrowed from
their insightful work in much of my analysis. Complete proofs for each proposition, even though many are only
slightly different from the proofs found in Myerson and Satterthwaite, are given as an aid to the reader.
8.2 Formulation
Two parties, a buyer and a seller, are bargaining over the price of an object that can be produced by the seller at a
cost s and is worth b to the buyer. The seller’s cost s and the buyer’s valuation b are also called their reservation
prices, since they represent, respectively, the minimum and maximum price at which each party would agree to
trade. Both the buyer and the seller have costs of delaying the bargaining process. Specifically, the value of the
object is discounted in the future according to the positive discount rates r for the seller and s for the buyer.
Thus, the payoffs, if the bargainers agree to trade at the discounted price x at time t, are x – se
– rt for the seller and
be
–s t – x for the buyer. Should the players fail to reach agreement, both of their payoffs are zero. Implicit in this
formulation is the assumption that the bargainers discount future money at the same rate, so that at any time t the
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be possible for the players to achieve an infinite payoff by having the player with the lower discount rate lend an
arbitrarily large amount of money to the other player.
The buyer, although aware of his own valuation b, does not know the seller’s cost of production s, but assesses
this cost to be distributed according to the distribution F(s), with a positive density f(s) on [ , ] s s . Similarly, the
seller knows his cost s, but only assess the buyer’s valuation to be distributed according to the distribution G(b),
with a positive density g(b) on [ , ] b b . Their discount rates and the distributions of the potential buyers and sellers
are common knowledge. In addition, it is assumed that both the buyer and the seller are interested solely in
maximizing their expected monetary gain.
To summarize, let ÆF,G,r,sæ be a sequential direct revelation game, where
F = the distribution of the seller’s cost s on [ , ] s s ,
G = the distribution of the buyer’s valuation b on [ , ] b b ,
r = the seller’s discount rate for the object,
s = the buyer’s discount rate for the object.
In the revelation game, the players’ actions consist of reports of their types, which are mapped into the bargaining
outcome by the bargaining mechanism. Thus, the seller s reports that his cost is  ¢ ˛ s s s [ , ], and the buyer b reports
that his valuation is  ¢ ˛ b b b [ , ]. The revelation game is said to be direct if the equilibrium strategies of the players
involve truthful reporting, that is, (s',b') = (s,b). The important role of direct revelation games stems from the fact
that one can, without loss of generality, restrict attention to direct mechanisms. For any Nash equilibrium of any
bargaining game, there is an equivalent direct mechanism that always yields the same outcomes. This well-known
result is called the revelation principle. Given any mechanism M that maps reports into outcomes, and a set of
equilibrium strategies x that maps true types into reported types, then the composition  $ M M x = o is a direct
mechanism that achieves the same outcomes as the mechanism M.
For the revelation game ÆF,G,r,sæ, a sequential bargaining mechanism is the pair of outcome functions
T(￿|￿,￿) and x(￿,￿), where T (t|s,b) is the probability distribution that the object will be transferred to the buyer at
time t, and x(s,b) is the discounted expected payment from the buyer to the seller, given that the seller and buyer
report the reservation prices s and b, respectively.
Typically, randomization of the outcomes over time is not necessary. Without randomization, the outcome
function T can be replaced by the function t(￿,￿), which determines the time of trade given the players’ reports. A
sequential bargaining mechanism, then, is the set of outcome functions Æt, xæ where t(s,b) is the time of trade and
x(s,b) is the discounted expected payment, given that the seller reports s and the buyer reports b. Most bargaining
mechanisms seen in practice require that the exchange of money and goods take place at the same time. Such a
requirement is not restrictive in this model, because there is no benefit to be gained by exchanging money at a
different time from the exchange of the good, since both players have identical time preferences for money. For
reasons of tractability, I will frequently restrict attention to the simplified mechanism Æt, xæ.
8.3 Perfect bargaining mechanisms
The weakest requirements one would wish to impose on the bargaining mechanism ÆT, xæ in the direct revelation
game are (1) individual rationality, that is, that everyone wishes to play the game, and (2) incentive compatibility,
that is, that the mechanism induces truth telling. In addition, when the bargainers are unable to make binding
commitments, one needs the further restriction of sequential rationality: It must never be common knowledge that
the mechanism induced over time is dominated by an alternative mechanism. Bargaining schemes that satisfy
incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and sequential rationality are called perfect bargaining
mechanisms. The adjective perfect is adopted because of the close relationship between perfect bargaining
mechanisms in the direct revelation game and perfect (or sequential) equilibria in an infinite horizon extensive-
form game. It remains to be proven that a sequential bargaining mechanism is perfect if and only if it is a perfect
equilibrium for some infinite-horizon extensive-form game. This issue will be addressed in future research.
In this section, I derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the sequential bargaining mechanism to be
perfect. The incentive-compatibility and individual-rationality conditions were first established in Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1983), and later extended to the case of multiple buyers and sellers by Wilson (1982) and Gresik
and Satterthwaite (1983). It is important to realize that these properties are actually necessary and sufficient
conditions for any Nash equilibrium of any bargaining game, since every Nash equilibrium induces a direct
revelation mechanism, as mentioned in Section 8.2.Peter C. Cramton 4
Incentive compatibility
In order to define and determine the implications of incentive compatibility on the sequential bargaining
mechanism ÆT, xæ, it is convenient to divide each player’s expected payoff into two components as follows. Let
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where S(s) is the discounted expected revenue and P(s) the discounted probability of agreement for seller s, and
B(b) is the discounted expected payment and Q(b) the discounted probability of agreement for buyer b. Thus, the
seller’s and buyer’s discounted expected payoffs are given by
U(s) = S(s) – sP(s) and V(b) = bQ(b)–B(b),
respectively.
Formally, the sequential bargaining mechanism ÆT, xæ is incentive compatible if every type of player wants to
report truthfully his type; that is, for all s and s' in [ , ] s s and for all b and b' in [ , ] b b ,
U(s) ‡ S(s')- sP(s') and V(b) ‡ bQ(b')B(b').
Lemma 1. If the sequential bargaining mechanism ÆT, xæ is incentive compatible, then the seller’s expected payoff
U is convex and decreasing, with derivative dU/ds = – P almost everywhere on [ , ] s s ; his discounted probability
of agreement P is decreasing; and
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Similarly, the buyer’s expected payoff V is convex and increasing, with derivative dV/db = Q almost everywhere
on [ , ] b b ; his discounted probability of agreement Q is increasing; and
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Proof. By definition, seller s achieves the payoff U(s) = S(s) - sP(s). Alternatively, seller s can pretend to be
seller s', in which case his payoff is S(s') - sP(s'). In the direct revelation game, the seller s must not want to
pretend to be seller s', and so we have U(s) ‡ S(s') - sP(s') for all s,s' ˛ [ , ] s s , or
U(s) ‡ U(s') - (s - s')P(s'),
implying that U has a supporting hyperplane at s' with slope - P(s') £ 0. Thus, U is convex and decreasing with
derivative (dU/ds)(s) = - P(s) almost everywhere, and P must be decreasing, which implies the first integral in (S)
(I will use the Stieltjes integral throughout, so that any discontinuities in the probability of agreement are
accounted for in the integral.) From integration by parts,
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which, together with the definition of U, yields the second integral in (S). The proof for the buyer is identical.
Lemma 1 indicates the stringent requirements that incentive compatibility imposes on the players' utilities. In
particular, it suggests how one can construct an incentive-compatible payment schedule x, given a probability of
agreement distribution ` for which the seller's discounted probability of agreement P(s) is decreasing in s and the
buyer’s discounted probability of agreement Q(b) is increasing in b.
Lemma 2. Given the sequential bargaining mechanism Æ`, xæ such that P is decreasing, Q is increasing, and S and
B satisfy (S) and (B) of lemma 1, then Æ`, xæ is incentive compatible.Sequential bargaining mechanisms 5
Proof. A mechanism is incentive compatible for the seller if for all s, s' ˛ [ , ] s s ,
S(s) - sP(s) ‡ S(s') - sP(s').
Rearranging terms yields the following condition for incentive compatibility:
s(P(s') - P(s)) + S(s) - S(s') ‡ 0. (S')
From (S), we have
S s S s udP u
s
s
( ) ( ) ( ), = ¢ = -
¢z
and from the fundamental theorem of integral calculus,
s P s P s s dP u
s
s
( ( ) ( )) ( ). ¢ - =
¢z
Adding the last two equations results in
s P s P s S s S s s u dP u
s
s
( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ¢ - + - ¢ = - ‡
¢z 0
where the inequality follows because the integrand (s – u)dP(u) is nonnegative for all s, u ˛ [ , ] s s , since P is
decreasing. Hence, ÆT, xæ satisfies the incentive-compatibility condition (S'). An identical argument follows for
the buyer.
Individual rationality
The sequential bargaining mechanism ÆT, xæ is individually rational if every type of player wants to play the
game; that is, for all sin [ , ] s s  and b in [ , ] b b ,
U s V b ( ) ( ) . ‡ ‡ 0 0     and     
In light of the monotonicity of U and V proven in lemma 1, any incentive-compatible mechanism ÆT, xæ will
satisfy individual rationality if the extreme high-cost seller and low-valuation buyer receive a nonnegative payoff;
that is, an incentive-compatible mechanism ÆT, xæ is individually rational if and only if U s ( ) ‡ 0and V b ( ) . ‡ 0
The following lemma describes how one can check whether or not a sequential bargaining mechanism is
individually rational. It is convenient to state the lemma in terms of the simplified bargaining mechanism Æt, xæ
rather than in terms of ÆT, xæ. Recall that for the sequential bargaining mechanism Æt, xæ, we have
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Lemma 3. If the sequential bargaining mechanism Æt, xæ is incentive compatible and individually rational, then













( , ) ( , ) + = -
- F
HG I
KJ - + F
HG I









where the expectation is taken with respect to s and b.
Proof.  First note that from lemma 1, for Æt, xæ to be individually rational, it must be that U s ( ) ‡ 0 and V b ( ) . ‡ 0
For the seller, we havePeter C. Cramton 6
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where the first equality follows from lemma 1 and the second equality results from changing the order of
integration. Similarly, for the buyer we have
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Rearranging terms in (US) and (UB) and substituting the definitions for U(s) and V(b), result in the desired
expression (IR) for U s V b ( ) ( ). +
Lemma 4. If the function t(￿,￿) is such that P is decreasing, Q is increasing, and (IR) is satisfied, then there exists
a function x(￿,￿) such that Æt, xæ is incentive compatible and individually rational.
Proof.  The proof is by construction. Let
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where c is a constant chosen such that V b ( ) . ‡ 0  To compute c, notice that
V b bQ b x s b f s ds
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Thus,
c bQ b s F s dP s
s
s
= + - z ( ) ( ( )) ( ). 1
Incentive compatibility for the seller is verified by showing that the seller s is better off reporting s than s' „ s:
For all s, s' ˛ [ , ] s s ,
s P s P s S s S s s dP u udP u
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since P is decreasing. An identical argument holds for the buyer.
Since V b ( ) = 0 and Æt, xæ is incentive compatible and satisfies (IR), it follows from lemma 3 that U s ( ) ‡ 0.
Thus, the bargaining mechanism Æt, sæ is incentive compatible and individually rational.Sequential bargaining mechanisms 7
Sequential rationality
To understand how learning takes place in a sequential bargaining mechanism, it is best to interpret the direct
revelation game as follows. At time zero (but after the players know their private information), the players agree
to adopt a particular sequential bargaining mechanism Æt,xæ that is interim efficient. (Note that any interim-
efficient mechanism can be chosen as a Nash equilibrium in an appropriately defined “choice-of-mechanism”
game.) The players then report their private information in sealed envelopes to a mediator, who will then
implement the mechanism Æt,xæ. (Actually, a third party is not necessary, since the role of the mediator can be
carried out by a computer programmed by the bargainers to execute the mechanism.) After opening the
envelopes, the mediator does not announce the outcome immediately by saying something like, “Trade shall
occur two months from now at the price of one thousand dollars,” but instead waits until two months have passed
and then announces, “Trade shall occur now at the price of one thousand dollars.” The mediator must wait until
the time of trade in order that the mechanism be sequentially rational, since otherwise the bargainers would have
an incentive to ignore the mediator’s announcement and trade immediately.
As time passes, the players are able to refine their inferences about the other player’s private information
based on the information that the mediator has not yet made an announcement about. Initially, it is common
knowledge that the players’ valuations are distributed according to the probability distributions F and G but after
t units of time the common-knowledge belief’s become the distributions F and G conditioned on the fact that an
announcement has not yet been made; that is,
F s F st s b G b G b t s b t t t t ( ) ( | ( , ) ) ( ) ( | ( , ) ). = > = >      and     
Thus, at any time t > 0, the mechanism Æt,xæ induces an outcome function t(s,b) = t(s,b | Ft, Gt) for all s and b. A
mechanism Æt,xæ is sequentially rational if at every time t ‡ 0, the induced outcome function t(s,b | Ft, Gt) is
interim efficient, that is, there does not exist a mechanism Æt', x'æ preferable to Æt,xæ at some time t ‡ 0 for all
remaining traders and strictly preferred by at least one trader.
The following lemma relates the definition of sequentially rational to common-knowledge dominance.
Lemma 5. A sequential bargaining mechanism Æt, xæ is sequentially rational if and only if it is never common
knowledge that the mechanism t(￿,￿| Ft, Gt) that it induces over time is dominated by an alternative mechanism.
Proof.  From theorem 1 of Holmström and Myerson (1983), we know that a mechanism is interim efficient if and
only if it is not common knowledge dominated by any other incentive-compatible and individually rational
mechanism.
A necessary condition for a mechanism to be sequentially rational is that the bargainers continue negotiations
so long as each expects positive gains from continuing. For the model here, since there are no transaction costs
(only delay costs), this means that negotiations cannot end if there exists a pair of players that have not yet come
to an agreement, but for which agreement is beneficial at some point in the future. Formally, for the bargaining
mechanism Æt,xæ to be sequentially rational, it must be that for all potential players, a failure to reach agreement
implies that there is some point beyond which agreement is never beneficial; that is, for all s and b,
t s b ( , ) = ¥ ￿there exists  $ t ‡ 0 such that for every t t
r s t > ‡
- $, .
( ) s be
The condition  s be ‡
- ( ) r s t is simply a statement that trade is not beneficial at time t, since
x se be x se be s be - + - ‡ ￿ ‡ ￿ ‡
- - - - - rt st rt st r s t 0
( ) .
Notice that the strength of this requirement depends on the relative magnitudes of the players’ discount rates.
When r > s, then e
( ) r s t - ﬁ ¥ as t ﬁ ¥, and so for all potential pairs of players it is always the case that there
exists a time at which trade is beneficial. Thus, when r > s, the mechanism Æt,xæ is sequentially rational only if
trade always occurs; that is, t(s,b) < ¥ for all s and b. Likewise, when r < s, then e
( ) r s t - ﬁ 0 as t ﬁ ¥, and so
for every pair of players there is always a point at which trade becomes undesirable for all times in the future.
Finally, if r = s, then the necessary condition for sequential rationality becomes t(s,b) = ¥ ￿ s ‡ b; that is, trade
must occur whenever the gains from trade are initially positive.
To state this necessary condition in a lemma, it will be useful to define B as the set of potential traders for
which trade is always beneficial at some time in the future; that is,
B = {(s,b) | r > s or (r = s and s £ b)}.Peter C. Cramton 8
Lemma 6. Any mechanism Æt,xæ that excludes trade over a nonempty subset of B violates sequential rationality.
Proof. Let N ￿ B be the set for which trade never occurs. Then, at some point in time t, the induced mechanism
has t(s,b‰Ft, Gt) = ¥ for all remaining traders, which includes N. However, this mechanism is not interim
efficient, since it is dominated by a mechanism that results in a positive probability of trade for some traders in N
(a partially pooling equilibrium with this property will always exist).
I claim that sequential rationality is a necessary condition for rationality in games with incomplete information
in which commitment is not possible. If a mechanism is not sequentially rational, then at some point in time it is
common knowledge that all potential agents would prefer an alternative mechanism and hence this alternative
mechanism will be adopted by the agents at that point in time. Thus, it would be inconsistent for the players to
believe that the original mechanism would be carried out faithfully.
Necessary, and sufficient conditions for perfection
Lemmas I through 5 are summarized in the following theorem, which gives necessary and sufficient conditions
for the sequential bargaining mechanism Æt,xæ to be perfect.
Theorem 1. A sequential bargaining mechanism Æt,xæ is incentive compatible if and only if the functions
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Furthermore, for t such that P is decreasing and Q is increasing, there exists an x such that Æt,xæ is incentive
compatible and individually rational if and only if
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Finally, the mechanism Æt,xæ is sequentially rational if and only if it is never common knowledge that the
mechanism it induces over time is dominated by an alternative mechanism.
8.4 Efficiency
The set of perfect bargaining mechanisms is typically quite large, which means that there are many extensive-
form games with equilibria satisfying incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and sequential rationality. To
narrow down this set, it is natural to assume additional efficiency properties. Three notions of efficiency,
described at length by Holmström and Myerson (1983), are ex post, interim, and ex ante efficiency. The
difference between these concepts centers on what information is available at the time of evaluation: Ex ante
efficiency assumes that comparisons are made before the players know their private information, interim
efficiency assumes that the players know only their private information, and ex post efficiency assumes that all
information is known.
Ex post efficiency
Ideally, one would like to find perfect bargaining mechanisms that are ex post efficient. The mechanism Æt,xæ is ex
post efficient  if there does not exist an alternative mechanism that can make both players better off in terms of
their ex post utilities (after all of the information is revealed). (This is often called full-information efficiency in
the literature. Holmström and Myerson (1983) term this “ex post classical efficiency” to distinguish it from their
concept of ex post incentive-efficiency, in which incentive constraints are recognized.) Equivalently, for aSequential bargaining mechanisms 9
mechanism to be ex post efficient, it must maximize a weighted sum a1(s, b)u(s) + a2(s, b)n(b) of the players’ ex
post utilities for all s and b, where a1(￿,￿),  a2(￿,￿) ‡ 0 and the ex post utilities of seller s and buyer b are
u s b x s b se v s b be x s b
t s b t s b ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ).
( , ) ( , ) = - = -
- - r s     and    
Since the payoff functions are additively separable in money and goods, and thus utility is transferable between
players, we can assume equal weights (i.e., a1(s, b) = a2(s, b) = 1 for every s,b) without loss of generality. To
simplify notation, define p(s,b)= e
 – t(s,b), so that p(s,b)
r is the discounted probability of agreement for seller s
given that the buyer has valuation b, and p(s,b)
s is the discounted probability of agreement for buyer b given that
the seller has cost s. With this change, a sequential bargaining mechanism becomes the pair of functions Æp,xæ
where p: [ , ] s s  X [ , ] b b  ﬁ [0,1]. The bargaining mechanism Æp,xæ, then, is ex post efficient if for all s ˛ [ , ] s s  and
b ˛ [ , ] b b , the function p(s,b) is chosen to solve the program
max ( ) .
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Checking the boundary conditions and assuming that s, b ‡ 0 yields
p s b




































The following theorem demonstrates that it is impossible to find ex post-efficient mechanisms if the bargainers
are uncertain whether or not trade should occur immediately. This result is shown in an example in Cramton
(1984).
Theorem 2. There exists an incentive-compatible, individually rational bargaining mechanism that is ex post
efficient if it is common knowledge that trade should occur immediately. However, an ex post-efficient
mechanism does not exist if the buyer’s delay cost is at least as great as the seller’s and it is not common
knowledge that gains from trade exist.
Proof. Suppose that it is common knowledge that trade should occur immediately. Then, three cases are possible:
(1) r £ s and  s b £ ,  (2) r > s and  r s s b £ ,and (3) r = ¥ and s < ¥. What needs to be shown is that p*(s,b) =
1 for all s,b satisfies (IR). For cases (1) and (2),
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where the integration is done by parts. In case (3),
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Then, by lemma 4, there exists an x such that Æp,xæ is incentive compatible and individually rational.Peter C. Cramton 10
Now, assume that it is not common knowledge that gains from trade exist and the buyer’s delay cost is at least
as great as the seller’s (i.e. r £ s). Notice that when r £ s, we find that Æp,xæ is ex post efficient if trade occurs















Substituting this function for p into (IR) yields
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Thus any incentive-compatible mechanism that is ex post efficient must have
U s V b G u F u du
b
b
( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) , + = - - < z 1 0
and so it cannot be individually rational.
When the seller’s delay cost is greater than the buyer’s and it is not common knowledge that trade should
occur immediately, a general proof that ex post efficiency is not achievable cannot be given due to the
complicated expression for p*(s,b) in this case. However, analysis of examples (see Section 8.5) suggests that ex
post efficiency is typically unobtainable.
Ex ante efficiency
The strongest concept of efficiency, other than ex post efficiency (which is generally unobtainable), that can be
applied to games of incomplete information is ex ante efficiency. A player’s ex ante utility is his expected utility
before he knows his type. Thus, given the sequential bargaining mechanism Æp,xæ, the seller’s and buyer’s ex ante
utilities are
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The mechanism Æp,xæ is ex ante efficient if there does not exist an alternative mechanism that can make both
players better off in terms of their ex ante utilities. Thus, for a mechanism to be ex ante efficient, it must
maximize a weighted sum a1U + a2V of the players’ ex ante utilities, where a1,  a2 ‡ 0. For tractability and
reasons of equity, I will assume equal weights (i.e., a1 = a2 = 1). (One might think that the assumption of equal
weights is made without loss of generality, because the payoff functions here are additively separable in money
and goods, and thus utility is transferable between players. Although this intuition is correct in a setting ofSequential bargaining mechanisms 11
complete information, it is false when there is incomplete information, because an ex ante transfer of utility will
violate individual rationality for some players.) The use of unequal weights would not significantly change the
results but would greatly complicate the analysis.
If the bargainers were to choose a bargaining mechanism before they knew their types, it would seem
reasonable that they would agree to a scheme that was ex ante efficient. It is generally the case, however, that the
players know their private information before they begin negotiations, and therefore would be unable to agree on
an ex ante-efficient mechanism, since the players are concerned with their interim utilities U(s) and V(b) rather
than their ex ante utilities U and V. Nevertheless, it may be that the sequential bargaining mechanism is chosen by
an uninformed social planner or arbitrator, in which case the selection of an ex ante-efficient mechanism would
be justified. Alternatively, one might suppose that the choice of a bargaining mechanism is based on established
norms of behavior and that these norms have evolved over time in such a way as to produce ex ante-efficient
mechanisms. In situations where the choice of a bargaining mechanism does not occur before the players know
their types or is not handled by an uninformed third party, ex ante efficiency is too strong a requirement. The
weaker requirement of interim efficiency-that there does not exist a dominating mechanism in terms of the
players’ interim utilities U(s) and V(b)-is more appropriate.
The sum of the players’ ex ante utilities for the bargaining mechanism Æp,xæ is given by
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s r
A bargaining mechanism, then, is ex ante efficient if it maximizes this sum subject to incentive compatibility and
individual rationality:
max { ( , ) ( , ) }
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where p is chosen such that P is decreasing and Q is increasing. Multiplying the constraint by l ‡ 0 and adding it
to the objective function yields the Lagrangian
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Then, the Lagrangian (ignoring the constant (1 + l)) becomes
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Establishing the boundary conditions and noticing that c(￿,￿)‡ 0 yields the optimal solution
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The following theorem determines how to find an ex ante-efficient mechanism for any sequential bargaining
game.
Theorem 3. If there exists an incentive-compatible mechanism Æp,xæ such that p = pa for some a in [0,1] and
U( s ) = V(b) = 0, then this mechanism is ex ante efficient. Moreover, if c(￿,1) and d(￿,1) are increasing functions
on [ , ] s s  and [ , ] b b , respectively, and ex post efficiency is unobtainable, then such a mechanism must exist.
Proof. The first statement in this theorem follows from the fact that the Lagrangian  L ( , ) p l  is maximized by the
function pa with a = l/(1 + l). Hence, pa yields an ex ante-efficient mechanism provided that the individual-
rationality constraint is binding.
To prove the existence part of the theorem, suppose that c(￿, 1) and d(￿, 1) are increasing, and that the players
are uncertain whether or not trade should occur immediately. Then, for every a ˛ [0,1], c(￿, a) and d(￿, a) are
increasing, which implies that pa(s,b) is increasing in s and decreasing in b. Thus, P is decreasing and Q is
increasing, as required by incentive compatibility.
It remains to be shown that there is a unique a ˛ [0,1], for which the individual-rationality constraint is
binding. Define
R d b p s b c s p s b ( ) { ( , )( ( , )) ( , )( ( , )) } a a
s
a
r = - E 1 1
so that R(a) is the value of the integral in the individual-rationality constraint as a function of a. First, notice that
R(1) ‡ 0, since the term in the expectation is nonnegative for all s and b. Furthermore, R(0) < 0, since there does
not exist an ex post-efficient mechanism. Therefore, if R(a) is continuous and strictly increasing in a, then there
is a unique a ˛ [0,1] for which R(a) = 0.
The continuity and monotonicity of R(￿) are most easily verified by considering two cases.
CASE 1 (r£ s).  When r£ s, then
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Thus, pa(s,b) is decreasing in a, since
















is decreasing in a. Thus, for or a < b. R(b) differs from R(a) only because 0 = pb(s,b) < pa(s,b) = 1 for some
(s,b) where d(b,b) < c(s,b), and so d(b,1) < c(s,1). Therefore, R(￿) is strictly increasing.
To prove that R(￿) is continuous, observe that if c(s,1) and d(b,1) are increasing in s and b, then c(￿,a) and
d(￿,a) are strictly increasing for any a < 1. So, given b and a, the equation c(s,a) = d(b,a) has at most one
solution in s, and this solution varies continuously in b and a. Hence, we may write









= - z z 1 1
where r(b,a) is continuous in b and a. Thus, R(a) is continuous in a.
CASE 2 (r > s).  When r > s, thenSequential bargaining mechanisms 13
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and d(b,a) are decreasing in a, pa(s,b) is decreasing in a. Thus, for a < b, R(b) differs from R(a) only because
pb(s,b) < pa(s,b) for some (s,b) where sd(b,a) < rc(s,a). Therefore, R(￿) is strictly increasing.
Since c(￿,a) and d(￿,a) are strictly increasing for any a < 1, the equation d(b,a) = 0 has at most one solution
in b and the equation rc(s,a) = sd(b,a) has at most one solution in s, and the solutions vary continuously in b
and a. Hence, we may write
R d b c b f s ds
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where q(a) and r(b, a) are continuous in b and a. Therefore, R(a) is continuous in a.
Since R(￿) is continuous and strictly increasing, with R(0) < 0 and R(l) ‡ 0, there must be a unique a ˛ [0,l]
such that R(a) = 0 and pa(s,b) is ex ante efficient.
It is worthwhile to point out that the requirement in the existence part of theorem 3 that c(￿,1) and d(￿,1) be
increasing functions is satisfied by a large range of distribution functions. A sufficient condition for c(￿,1) and
d(￿,1) to be increasing is for the ratio of the distribution and the density to be increasing. This is a local
characterization of the monotone likelihood ratio property and is satisfied by many distributions, such as the
uniform, exponential, normal, chi-square, and Poisson distributions.
I now prove that the ex ante-efficient mechanism typically violates sequential rationality, and hence show that
bargainers who are unable to make binding commitments are worse off (in an ex ante sense) than bargainers who
are able to commit to particular strategies.
Corollary 1. If ex post efficiency is unobtainable, c(￿,1) and d(￿,1) are increasing functions, and d(b,1) < 0 if r >
s, then the ex ante-efficient mechanism violates sequential rationality.
Proof. By theorem 3, the ex ante-efficient mechanism exists and is given by pa for some a > 0. Consider the set
of traders who never trade under pa, but for whom trade is always beneficial at some point in the future:
N = {(s,b)‰pa(s,b) = 0  and  [r>s or (r=s and s£b]}.
By our hypothesis, this set is nonempty. Thus, from lemma 6, the mechanism pa violates sequential rationality.
8.5 The case of uniform symmetric exchange: An example
To illustrate the theory presented in the earlier sections, it will be useful to look at an example. In particular,
consider the case of uniform symmetric exchange in which both the seller’s cost and the buyer’s valuation are
uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Then, c(s,a) = (1 + a)s and d(b, a) = (1 + a)b – a, which are strictly increasing
when a = 1, and so by theorem 3 we know that, for some a ˛ [0,1], the mechanism p = pa is ex ante efficient.
The desired a is found by setting R(a) to zero, so that U s ( ) =V b ( )  = 0. Again, it will be useful to consider two
cases depending on whether r £ s or r > s.





























Define m = a/(1 + a). Then, we wish to find m ˛ [0,1] such that
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Performing the integration yields
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When r £ s, ex ante efficiency is obtained by a mechanism that transfers the object without delay if and only if
the buyer’s valuation exceeds the seller’s by at least 3. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the ex ante-efficient
mechanism in this case does not depend on r or a. Since the value of the object is declining more rapidly for the
buyer than for the seller, it is always better to transfer the item immediately, if at all. Hence, even though the
players can reveal information by delaying agreement, in the ex ante-efficient mechanism they choose to trade
immediately or not at all, so that a static mechanism ex ante dominates any sequential bargaining mechanism.
This static mechanism, however, is not sequentially rational, which illustrates corollary 1.
An extensive-form game that implements the ex ante-efficient mechanism when r £ s has been studied by
Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983). They consider the simultaneous-offers game, in which the players
simultaneously announce prices and the object is traded if the buyer’s bid exceeds the seller’s offer. For this
example, the seller’s optimal strategy is to offer the price  2
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4 , as in the ex ante-efficient
mechanism. For this equilibrium, the price at which the object is sold is
x s b



























The sum of the players’ ex ante utilities is
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Thus, 15.6 percent of the gains from trade are lost when r £ s, due to delays in agreement.

















































| | | |
T




























2 1 2 2 1 2 0 z z z L













- - ( / )( )
( / )( )
/( ) /( )
( ) ( )



















d m d m
( )
( )
( ) [( )[ ( )] [ ( )] ] ] .
b
b
b s ds b b b s ds db
-
+ -
- z z z - - + - - - - =
Performing the inner integration (assuming g „ 1) yields
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after integration we have
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Given d = s/r, a root m ˛ [0,1] to (R) is easily found numerically.
The sum of the players’ ex ante utilities is computed as follows:
U V + = L
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The value of m and the efficiency of the ex ante-efficient mechanism relative to the first-best (full-information)
solution are shown in Figure 8.1 and Figure 8.2, respectively, as the ratio of the players’ discount rates is varied
from 0 to 1. Bargaining efficiency improves as the seller’s discount rate is increased relative to the buyer’s. When
the players’ discount rates are equal, 15.6 percent of the gains from trade are lost due to delays in agreement.
This inefficiency decreases to zero as r ﬁ ¥, illustrating theorem 2.
8.6 Conclusion
Two important features of any bargaining setting are information and time. Bargainers typically have incomplete
information about each other’s preferences, and therefore must communicate some of their private information in
order to determine whether or not gains from trade exist. One means of communication is for the agents to signal
their private information through their willingness to delay agreement: Bargainers who anticipate large gains
from trade will be unwilling to delay agreement and so will propose attractive terms of trade that the other is
likely to accept early in the bargaining process, whereas bargainers expecting small gains will prefer to wait for
better offers from their opponent. In this chapter, I have described the properties of such a bargaining model, by
analyzing a sequential direct revelation game.
Modeling the bargaining process as a sequential game, where the agents communicate their private
information over time, has two main advantages. First, from the point of view of realism, one commonly observes
bargaining taking place over time. Second, any static bargaining mechanism, because it does not permit the
agents to learn about their opponent’s preferences, must end with positive probability in a situation where gains
from trade are possible and yet no agreement is reached. If both bargainers know that gains from trade exist, what
prevents them from continuing negotiations until an agreement is reached? By introducing the time dimension,
and hence allowing the bargainers to communicate through their actions over time, one is able to construct
perfect bargaining mechanisms, in which the bargainers continue to negotiate so long as they expect positive
gains from continuing.
When the bargainers discount future gains according to known and fixed discount rates, it was found that the
bargainers may be better off (in terms of their ex ante utilities) using a sequential bargaining mechanism than a
static scheme. This is the result of the time dimension introducing an additional asymmetry into the problem,
which may be exploited to construct sequential bargaining mechanisms that ex ante dominate the most efficient
static mechanisms. Even in situations where a static mechanism is ex ante efficient, it is unlikely that such a
mechanism would be adopted by the bargainers, since it necessarily would violate sequential rationality.
The analysis presented here represents an early step toward understanding how agreements are reached in
conflict situations under uncertainty. Several simplifying assumptions have been made in order to keep the
analysis manageable. First, modeling the agents’ time preferences with constant discount rates is an appealing
example, but not an accurate description of all bargaining settings. (Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982) derive under
which circumstances the discounting assumption is valid. In particular, they prove that any preferences over
bargaining outcomes that are monotonic, continuous, and stationary can be represented by discounting provided
the bargainers exhibit impatience over all outcomes except that of no agreement.) Second, the agents have been
assumed to be risk neutral, but in many bargaining situations the agents’ willingness to take risks is an important
bargaining factor. Third, I have restricted attention to rational agents who can calculate (at no cost) their optimal
strategies. Certainly, few agents are so consistent and calculating. With less-than-rational agents, an agent’s
capacity to mislead his opponent becomes an important variable in determining how the gains from trade are
divided. Finally, I have assumed that the players’ valuations are independent. However, in many settings the
bargainers’ valuations will be correlated, and so, for example, the seller’s willingness to trade may be a signal of
the valuation of the object to the buyer.
Although it would be useful in future research to weaken the simplifying assumptions made here, perhaps the
most fruitful avenue for further study is the analysis of specific extensive-form bargaining games. The advantage
of looking at specific extensive-form games is that the bargaining rules are independent of the probabilistic
beliefs that the players have about each other’s preferences. In a direct revelation game, on the other hand, the
bargaining rule depends in a complicated way on these probabilistic beliefs. Because of this dependence, direct
revelation games are not played in practice.
Can one find a strategic game that comes close to implementing the ex ante-efficient bargaining mechanism
over a wide range of bargaining situations? Initial studies along these lines have been conducted by Cramton
(1984), Fudenberg and Tirole (1983), and Sobel and Takahashi (1983). All three papers consider a model in
which only one of the bargainers makes offers. When the players’ reservation prices are uniformly distributed on
[0,1] and their discount rates are equal, it was found that this model results in 32 percent of the gains from trade
being lost, as opposed to 16 percent being lost when the ex ante-efficient bargaining mechanism is adoptedSequential bargaining mechanisms 19
(Cramton (1984)). Thus, the players’ inability to commit to ending negotiations results in a bargaining outcome
that is significantly less efficient than if commitment were possible.
Perhaps a better candidate for a strategic bargaining game that is nearly ex ante efficient is the game in which
the bargainers alternate offers. This game was analyzed by Rubinstein (1982) in a setting of complete
information, but an analysis with incomplete information has yet to be done. Of particular interest is the
alternating-offers game as the time between offers goes to zero, because this strategic game represents a very
general bargaining rule: At any time, a bargainer may make a new offer or accept the most recent offer of his
opponent. It would be a pleasant surprise if such a reasonable bargaining game was nearly ex ante efficient over a
variety of circumstances.
A second promising area for research is further study on the implications of sequential rationality to
bargaining and to more general games of incomplete information. I intend to address this issue in depth in future
research.
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